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A special grand jury in~he NO Illinois , in the c ourse of investigat-

~

2
~

ing illegal gamblin~subpoenaed about twenty persons , including resps :
and sought to obtain from them voice exemp_lars\for identification pur-

,/f

poses . Each witness was informed that he was a potential defendant

~

in a matter being investigated by the grand jury . Each was asked to

~

examine a transcript of a recording of an authorized intercepted comman6 to go to a nearby room and read the transcript into a
connected to a recording device . Resps . refused to comply ,

~

with this

~xE~proceding ,

asserting rights under the Fourth and Fifth

Amendments ,
The USOC NO Ill . ordered resps . to furnish the exemplars . The CA7
~

reversed , holding that though no Fifth and Sixth Amendment privileges
~

were involved , tha~c.ompeling comliance would infringe on resps. Fourth
Amendment rights . "We believe the proposition to be clearly established

-fl,e

that underAFourth Amendment}law enforcement officials may not compel
the production of physical evidence absent a showing of the reasonableness of the seizure. ••• It is evident

t~wthat

the grand jury is seeking

to EEobtain the voice exemplars of the witnesses by the use of its sub-

- --

poena powers because probable cause did • not exist for their arrest or i
for some other, :il:eesless unusual method of compelling the

exemplars . ~~

In its decision the CA? relied heavily on two of this Court ' s

A---

-

decisions . In Hale v . Henkel, 201
bh>O.;)

u.s .

43(1906) the Court struck down

a grand jury ordeqfor the production of documents under a subpoena
duces tecum • as an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment . In holding the subpoena overbroad, the Court said that "a
su..b,oe..?J-=general seeFon ~MFFe~t of this description is equally indefensible as
a search warrant would be if couched in similar terms."

I

The second case on which the CA7 relied heavily was Davis
~-

v . Mississippi, 394 U.S . 721(1969) where the police detained and finger-

. > ::-

printed a large number of Negro youths in their investigation of an a:il::il:e

alleged rape where the assailant was described only as a Negro youth.
The Court in holding the procedure invalid , said that the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent such "wholesale intrusions upon the personal

-

security of our citizenry . " The CA7 thus interpolated that the fourth
.......
-Amendme~o prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of
the citizenry whether the intrusions resulted from illegal arrests a. GL5
in Davis or from wholesale grana-Ju ry subpoenas as in the instan~ case .
The SG disagrees sharp!
Court to

with the CA7 holding and

~
~~~-----------===-----===~=a-----
gran~. The SG attacks the CA? holding as

reques~

this

"in sharp conflict

with the essential function of the grand jury and will seriously interfere with the broad investisatory powers heretofore exercised by it ••••
?

p

It is the essence of the grand jury proceeding to question and obtain evidence from a witness in circumstances that would not permit detaining
under any probable cause

''

st~N~standard.

In this respect the grand jury•s

powers
..__ exceed those of most investigatory bodies , including the

'•

him~

polic~ ••••

The CA? holding would force the government to litigate the
~e~Mi~emquestion

of reasonableness before enforcement of a grand

jury subpoena seeking this type of

eviden~.

Such litigious

interruptions of the grand jury process have long been discouraged
b¥ this Court." The

~SG

further minimizes the precedential value

of the Davis and Henkel cases relied on by the CA?» saying that

.

Davis involved police arrests , not grand jury subpoenas and that
~

~

Henkel involved a serious incursion into privacy by

me~axmeans

of a subpoena duces tecum whereas the instant case involves
fi~~exvoice

exemplars which do not represent serious interference

with a either a

sMs~egt*switness's

convenience or his private

t~EM~

thoughts .
The broad use of the subpoena power in this case comes
f l

l r

perilously close to being the kind of fishing expediuon that
this Court condemned in both Davis and Henkel . I

thin~

brief unduly minimizesm the precedential

of those

effec~s

decisions . However , a balancing of the need for broad

the SGs

~xaE~

grand jury powers in law enforcement against the inconvenience
and invasion of privacy of resps ! in this case would lead

m~me

~want to GRANT and quite possibly reverse the holding o~CA?.

I

I feel the question has importamt enough implications in the
field of law enforcement
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No. 71-229 OT 1971
United States v. Dionisio
Cert to CA7(Swygert, Fairfield, Kerner). -Per Curiam.
This case involves the important issue of whether the
goJJernment
~~a~EX~M~~ must make a showing of reasonableness before it
obtains voice and handwriting exemplars from witnesses¥ ip
;:::::><

a grand jury proceeding. I think you should read both this cert
note over as well as

the~~

one I a have written in No.71-850.

I remain firmly convinced that this is a case that ought to
merit a
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Memorandum to the file
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Re: 71-229

October 10, 1972

United States v. Dionisio

Judge Friendly has an opinion in case 71-6522 (see my
cert note) that is relevant to Dionisio and I should read this.

L.F.P.,Jr.

LFP, Jr.:pls

-
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CHAMBER S OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

December 28, 1972

Re:

No. 71-229 - United States v. Dionisio

Dear Potter:
Please join me.

Sincerely/

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

.'

;§u:pTtutt ~cud cf tltt 'Jllnittb' j)tattg

'J.'agJrittghm. ~.

~· 2llbfJl.~

CHAMBERS OF

THE: CHIEF JUSTICE

December 30, 1972

Re: No. 71-22 9 - U. S. v. Dionisio

Dear Potter:
Please join me.
I would be much more comfortable -- and I
submit we would be more accurate -- to alter the top
line on page 16 by substituting for "be wholly rea listie"
the follow :ing, "perform the same protective function
as originally. contemplated".
Regards,

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

§nprtm~ Q_\tntt

t1f tl!t'~tnitdt §taus

wa~•lringtcn,

p. <e.

20,5)~,3

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

January

Re:

4, 1973

No. 71-229- United States v. Dionisio

Dear Potter:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

;,-z
\

I

' V,.....

'
Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to Conference

<qtmrt ctf tqt 'Jlltti.Ub- ~taftg
~ltill~tcttt. lQ. <q. 20gtJ1$

~u:prtmt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

January 11, 1973

R,e:

No. 71-229 -

United States v. Dionisio

Dear Potter:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

/ft· IS.
Mr. Justice Stewart

Copies to the Conference
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Ju.::;t ice Brerman
White
Ur. Jus"Clce Harshal l '
Mr. Juztice Bl~cb 1 un
Mr. Justice Powell /
Mr. J us tice Rehnquist

lr.

Just~ ce

From: Stewart , J.
2nd DRAFT

Circulated:

DEC 2 7 1972

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ~TfTE~ted: _ _ __
Ko. 71- 229
United States, Petitioner,)On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of
. D. . .
l
Appeals for the Seventh
Al1 t 01110 10l11Sl0 et a.
c·lrCUl.t .
[January -, 1973]
MR. J usrrcE S·rEWART delivered the opinion of the
Court.
A special grand jury was convened in the Northern
District of Illinois in February 1971 , to investigate possible violations of federal criminal statutes relating to
gambling. In the course of its investigation the grand
jury received in evidence certain voice recordings that
had been obtained pursuant to court orders. 1
The grand jury subpoenaed approximately 20 persons, including the respondent Dionisio, seeking to obtain
from them voice exemplars for comparison with the reThe court orders were issued pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 2518,
a statute authorizing the interception of wire communications upon
a judicial determination that " (a) there is probable cause for
belief that an individual is committing, has commit ted, or is about
to commit a particular offense enumerated in section 2516 of this
chnpter [inrluding the transmis~ion of wagering information];
(b) there is probable cau~c for belief that particular communications
concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception;
(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and ha\·e fnilcd
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to ~uccced if tried or to be
too dangerous: (d) there is probable ca u ~e for belief that the
facilities from which, or the place where, the wire or oral communications arc to be intercepted are bciug used , or arc nbout to
be used, in connection with the commis~ion oF such offense, or are
leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such per~o n ."
1

71-229-0I'Il'\TO~

2
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corded conversaLions that had been received in evidence.
Each ''"itness ''"as advised that he was a potential defendant in a criminal prosecution. Each "·as asked to examine a tra11scnpt of a-;-;"' intercepted conversation, and
to go to a nearby office of the United States Attorney to
read the trans<'ript into a recording device. The witllcsscs were advised that they would be allowed to have
their attorneys present when they read the transcripts.
Dionisio and other witnesses refused to furnish the voice
exemplars, asserting that these disclosures '"ould violate
tlwir rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
The Government then filed separate petitions in the
United States District Court to compel Dionisio and
the other witnesses to furnish the voice exemplars to
the grand jury. The petitions stated that the exemplars
were "essential and necessary'' to the grand jury investigation, and that they would "be used solely as a standard
of comparison in order to determine whether or not the
witness is the person whose voice was intercepted .... "
Following a hearing. the district judge rejected the
witnesses' constitutional arguments and ordered them to·
comply with the grand jury's request. He reasoned that
voice exemplars, like handwriting exemplars or fi~er
prints, were not testimonial or commumcatiVcevidence,
andthat consequently ilie-order to proclucc them would
not compel any witness to testify against himself. The
district judge also found that there would be no Fourth
Amendment violation, because the grand jury subpoena
did not itself violate the Fourth Amendment, and the
order to produce the voice exemplars would involve no
unreasonable search and seizure within the proscription
of that Amendment:
"The witnesses arc lawfully before the grand jury
pursuant to subpoena. The Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizureapplies only where identifying physical character-

, '1.-

71-229-0PI?\ LON
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3

is tics, such as fingeqwin ts, are obtained as a result
of unla\\'ful detention of a suspect, or when an intrusion into the body, such as a blood test, is undertaken without a "·arrant, absent an emergency
situation. E. g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S.
721. 724- 728 (1909); Schmerber v. California, 384
U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966)." ~
When Dionisio persisted in his refusal to respond to the
grand jury's directive, the District Court adjudged him
in civil contempt and ordered him committed to custody
until he obeyed the court order. or until the expiration of
18 months."
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.
442 F. 2<.1 276. It --agreed '"ith the District Court in
rejecting the Fifth Amendment claims. 1 but concluded
that to compel the voice recordings "·ould violate the
Fourth Amendment. In the Court's view, the grand
jury was "seeking to obtain the voice exemplars of the '"itnesses by the use of its subpoena po,Ycrs because probable
cause did not exist for their arrest or for some other,
less unusual, method of compelling the production of the
exemplars." Id., at 280. The Court found that the
Fourth Amendment applied to grand jury process. and
that "under the fourth amendment ]a\\' enforcement
officials may not compel the production of physical eviclencr absent a showing of the reasonableness of the
seizure. Davis v. Nlississippi, 394 U.S. 721 .... " Iuid.
In Davis this Court held that it '"as error to admit
thSJ2-e"'T'tt''ner's fingerpnnts into evidence at his trial f9r
" Thr dc·ci,.,ion of i hr Di~t rirt Comt i" umrportrcl.
:: Tlw lit'(• of t lw "PC('i:ll grand ,iur.1· w:t" lS month", but could br
rxtrndt'd for ::m uclditional 1~ month". 1~ C. S. C'. § :1331.
1Thr Comt nl"o rrjrrtrcl thr argumrnt tlwt thr grnnd .im~·
proerdurr l'iolatc•d the witnr~,r~' Sixth Amrndmrnt right to eotlll::<rl.
It found t!H' contention parlieulad.1· without mrrit in Yic•11· ol' thr
option :1fl'orded thr witnr~~r;,; to ha1·r thrir nttonw.'·" prr~c·nt whilr
i hr)· mndr t hr Yoier rceording". 4-1-2 F. 2d 27G, 27~.

71-229-0PINION
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rape, because they had been obtained during a police
detention following a la"·less wholesale roundup of the
~1er and more than 20 other youths. Equating
the procedures Iollowed 6y the grand jury in the present
case to the fingerprint detentions in Davis, the Court
of Appeals reasoned that " [ t] he dragnet effect here,
where approximately 20 persons vvere subpoenaed for
purposes of identification, has the same invidious effect
on fourth amendment rights as the practice condemned
in Davis." !d., at 281.
In view of a clear conflict between this decision and
one in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit," we
granted the Government's petition for certiorari. 406·
U. S. 956.
I
The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the contention that the compelled production of the voice exemplars would violate the Fifth Amendment. It has long
been held that the compelled display of identifiable physical characteristics infringes no uiterest protected by
the privile e a ainst com )Ulsor selfimination. In
Holt v. nited States, 218 U. S. 245, 252, Mr. Justice
Holmes, writing for the Court, dismissed as an "extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment" the argument
that it violated the privilege to require a defendant to
put on a blouse for identification purposes. He explained that "the prohibition of compelling a man in a
criminal court to be ~itness a ainst himself IS a prolTbition o t e usc of 12h~sical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body
as evidence when it may be material." !d. , at 252- 253.
" United States v. Doe (Schwartz ), 457 F. 2d 895 (aiftrming
civil contempt judgment against grand jury witne::;s for refn ~al t o
furni~ h handwriting exemplar~ ).

71-2:29-0PlNION
UNITED STATES v. DIONISIO

5·

More recently, in Schmerber v. Cal-ifornia, 384 U. S.
757, we relied on Holt~ an~1oted that
"both federal and state courts have usually held
that ·[the privilege] offers no protection against
compulsion to submit to fingerprinting. photogra )h-·
ini, or rneasuremen s, to wn e or spea or identificatiOn, to appear tn court, to stand, to assume a
stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.
The distinction which has emerged, often expressed
in different ways, is that the privilege is a b,2;r
against compeJling 'communications' or 'testimon ,'
but that compu s10n w 1c ma es a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does
not violate it." I d., at 764 (footnote omitted).

l

I

The Court held that the extraction and chemical analysis
of a blood sample involved no "shadow of testimonial
compulsion upon or enforced communication by the·
accused." I d., at 765.
These cases led us to conclude in Gilbert v. California,
388 U. S. 263, that handwriting exemplars were not )rOtected by the priv1l~e against compu sory self-incrimination. While " [ o] ne's voice and handwriting are, of
course, means of communication," we held that a "mere
handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what
is written, like the voice or body itself, is an identifying
physical characteristic outside its protection." Id., at
267. And similarly in United States v. Wade, 388 U. S.
218, we found no error in compelling a defendant ace
of bank robbery to u er m a me-up words that had
allegedly been spoken by the robber. The accused there
was "required to use his voice as an identifying physical
characteristic, not to speak his guilt." I d., at 222-223.
TV ade and Gilbert definitively refute any contention
that the compelled production of the voice exemplars
in this case would violate the Fifth Amendment. The

71-229-0PT~
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voice recordings were to be used solely to measure the
physical properties of the \\"itnesses' voices, not for the
testimonial or communicative content of "·hat was to
be said."
II
The Comt of Appeals held that the Fourth Amendment required a preffininary showing of reasonableness
hefore a grand jury witness could be compelled to furnish a voice exemplar, and that in this case the proposed
"smzurcs" of the voice exemplars would be unreasonable because of the large number of witnesses summoned
by the grand jury and directed to produce such exemplars.
We disagree.
The Fourth Amenclmen t guarantees that all people
shall be "secure in their persons. houses. 11apers, and
"The Comt of Apprnl~ for thr Sr,·rnth Ciri'uit :t pprnr~ to ha,·r
rr cnntrd ~omrwhat from it~ rlr:tr and rorrcrt holding in thr prr,;rnt
i':\~C th:d t hr compPIIrd product ion of Yoirr rxrmpla n-; would not
In
Yiolatr the pridrp;r n~ain~t rompul~or~- ~rlf-inrriminaiion.
subscqurntly 0xpl:lining that holding, ihr, Court qunlificd it:
' ·:\"r,·erthrlcs~. th r witnr~~e~ ll"err p otential clcfrndanh , and sincr
the pmpo ~c of till' Yoicr rxemplar~ was to idrntif~· thC' YOii'rs
obt n in rei b~ - FBI :tgrnt s pur~un nt to a ro mt-orclrrrcl wirrtap, the
~elf-incriminator~· impart of the• cornprllrcl rxPmplnr~ wns rlrnr.
Tim:- thC' compcllrcl rxrmplars wrrr nt odd~ with thr spirit of tllC'
Fifth Amrndmrnt. Brr:1usc thr Fifth Amrndmrnt illuminnirs thr
Fourth ( ~rr . . . Bo.nl v. l'nitrd Statrs [116 U. R. 616 I ... ). i!lC'
Fomth Amendmrnt Yiolation npprar~ morr rrndilY than whrrc immtmit~· is granted , and in Dionisio imrnunit~· hnd not ~'rt bern
gmntrd." Ji'raser \'. ["nited States. 4.12 F. 2d 6](), 619 n . .1.

But Boyd dr:tlt with thr compul~or_,. production of pri1·:tte book~
:l nd rrcorcb , tr~timonial sourer;;. n circum~hmcr in which thr " Fourth
:1nd Fifth Amrndmrnts nm almo~t into raeh othrr." 116 U. S.,
at 630. In 1he prrsC'nt cn~r. h~- cont ra~t. 110 Fifth .\mrndmrnt
intrrc~t ~ nrr .i ropnrdizrd. tltC'I'r i~ no hint of tr~timonial rompul~ion.
Thr Comt of A]lpr:tl~' ~uh.,equrnt nttempt to rend tltr "spirit of
1hr Fifth Amrndmrnt" into the produrtion of Yo icc rxrmplnrs
cannot stt1Ti1·r comparison with Wade, Gilbert , and Srhmerbcr.
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rffects, against unrea10onable searches and seizures .... "
Any Fourth Amendment violation in the present setting must rest on a. la ,\'less governmental intrusion
upon the Eacy of "persons" rather than on interference with "pt'O])erty rcnr:t't'Onsltips or private paperR."
Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 767; see United
States v. Doe (Sch wa.rtz). 437 F. 2d 895. 897. In Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1. the Court explained the protection
afforded to "persons'' in terms of the statement in Katz v.
Um'ted States, 389 U. S. 347, that "the Fourth Amendment protects people , not places." id., at 331, and concluded that "wlwrever an individual may harbor a.
reasonable 'expectation of privacy,' ... he is en ti tlrcl to
be freC' from unreasonable governmental intrnsion."
Terry Y. Ohio, 392 U. S .. at 9.
As the Court made clear in Schmerber, supra, the
obta.init 0' of )h sica.l evidence fron1 a person involves
a 120tcntial Four 1 men ment violation at t\YO different
levels-the "scizm e" of the "person" nC'ccssary to bring
him into contact with government agents. sec. Davis v.
MississiJrpi, 304 U. S. 721. and the subsequent search for
and seizure of the evidence. In Schmerber \Ye found
the initial seizure of the accused justified as a la,\'ful
arrest, and the subsequent seizure of the blood sample
from his body reasonable in light of thC' exigent circumstances. And in Terry, we concluded that twi ther
the initial seizure of the person. an investigatory "stop"
by a policeman. nor the subsequent search. a pat clmm
of his outer clothing for weapons. constituted a violation
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of the compulsory production of exemplars
from a grand jury witness necessarily turns on the same
dual inquiry- whether either the initial compulsion of
the person to appear before the grand jury, or the subsequent directive to make a voice recording is an unrC'asonable "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
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It is clear that ~subpoena to appear before a grand
jury is not a "seizure" in tfie ] ourth Amendment sense,
even tha'frgh th~ummons may be inconvenient or
burdensome. Last Term we again acknowledged what
has long been recognized,' that " [ c] itizens generally
ar~ not constitutionally immune from grand jury subpoenas .... " Bmnzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 682.
\~ncluded that:

"[a]lthough the powers of the grand jury are not
unlimited and are subject to the supervision of
a judge, the longstanding principle that 'the public
... has a right to every man's evidence,' except for
those persons protected by a constitutional, commonlaw, or statutory privilege, United States v. Bryan,
339 U. S., at 331; Blackmer v. United States, 284
U. S. 421, 438 (1932); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence·
§ 2192 (MeN a ugh ton rev. 1961), is particularly applicable to grand jury proceedings." !d., at 688.
These are recent reaffirmations of the historically
grounded obli ation of every person to appear and give
his evidence before t e gran JUry.
e personal sacrifice involved is a part of thenecessary contribution of
the individual to the welfare of the public." Blair v.
United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281. See also Garland v.
Torre, 259 F. 2d 545, 549. And while the duty may
be "onerous" at times, it is "necessary to the administration of justice." Blair v. United States, supra, at
281. 8
Sec generall~· Kastigar v. United Statl's, 406 U. S. 441, 443-444;
Blai1· v. Uuitl'd Stat!'s, 250 U. S. 273, 279-281; 8 J. Wigmore,
Evidrnce § 2191 (.J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
7

• The obligation to appear i~ no different for a per;;on who may
himself be the ~ ubject of the grand jury inquir~· . Scr l.i nill'd States
Y. Doe (Schwartz ), 457 F. 2d 895, 898; United States v. Winter,.
348 F. 2d 204, 207-208.
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The compulsion exerted by a grand jury subpoena
differs from the seizure eRected by an arrest ot even
an investigative "stop" 111 more than civic obligation.
For. as Judge ]'nenCITy wrote for the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit:
"The latter is abrupt, is effected with force or the
threat of it and often in demeaning circumstances,
and, in the case of arrest, results in a record involvillg social stigma. A subpoena is served in
the same manner as other legal process; it involves
no stigma whatever; if the time for appearance is inconvenient. this can generally be altered; a,ncl it remains at all times under the control and supervision
of a court." United States v. Doe (Schwartz) 457
F. 2d 895, 898.
Thus the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
correctly recognized in a case subsequent to the one
now before us, that "a grand jury subpoena to testify is
not that kind of governmental intrusion on privacy
against which the Fourth Amendment affords protection,
once the Fifth Amendment is satisfied." Fraser v.
United States, 452 F. 2d 616, 620; cf. United States v.
Weinberg, 439 F. 2d 743, 748-749.
This case is thus quite different from Davis v. MississiJa1i-supra, on which the Court of Appeals primarily
relied. For in Davis it was the initial seizure-the lawless dragnet detention-that violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments-not the taking of the fingerprints. We noted that " [ i] nvestigatory seizures would
subject unlimited numbers of innocent persons to the
harassment and ignominy incident to involuntary detention," 394 U. S., at 726, and we left open the question
"·hether, consistently with the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, narrowly circumscribed procedures might
be developed for obtaining fingerprints from people when

71-2:29-0Pil'\IOX
10

\

111\ITED STATES u. DIONISIO

there was no probable cause to arrest them. Id., at
728.n Davis is plainly inapposite to a case where the
initial restraint docs not itself infringe the Fourth
Amendment.
This is not to say that a grand jury subpoena is some
talisman that dissolves all constitutional protections.
The grand jury cannot require a witness to testify
agai11st himself. It cannot require the production by a
person of private books and records that would incriminate him. See Boyd v. United Slates, 116 U. S. 616,
633-635.'" The Fourth Amendment provides protection
against a grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sv.;eeping
in its terms "to be regarded as reasonable." Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U. fl. 43, 76; cf. Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 208, 217. And last Term,
in the context of a First Amendment claim, '"e indicated that the Constitution could not tolerate the transformation of the grand jury into an instrument of oppression: "Official harassment of the press undertaken
not for purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a
reporter's relationship \Yith his news sources would have
110 justification.
Grand juries arc subject to judicial
control and subpoenas to motions to quash. \Vc do not
expect courts \\'ill forget that grand juries must operate
within the limits of the First Amcndmen t as well as
0 .Tuclgr \Yrinfrld eorrrrtly dJ<ll'aC'trrizrcl Davis :IH "but anothrt"
applieation of the prineiplr that thr Fourth Amrndmrnt :tpplir~
to :tll ~rarchr8 and ~oizurr~ of the prr~on, no malt('t' what thr ;;;cope
or clmation. It hrld that in thr cin · um~tanrr~ thrrr Jll'r~rntrd the
([rt ent ion for the sole pnrpo~r of fi ng;crprint ing; was in viol:\! ion of
the Fourth Amendmrnt ban again~t unrra~onahlr ~rarC'h and ~rizmr."
Tlwm ,.. New York Stork E.cchanoe. 80(i F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (footnotr omitted). Scr al~o Allen ,., Cupp, 420 F. '2d 756, 760.
' 0 Vi'hilc Boyd wa~ concernrcl with n motion to procluer im·oirr~
nt a forfriturr trial , thr Conrt trratrcl it a~ the rqui,·alrnt of a
~ubporna du('es tc('/l/11, ancll/ale , .. Henl.·e/, 201 u.S . .J-3, 7G, applied
Bo!Jd in the contrxl of a grand jury ~ubpocna.

r

r
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the Fifth." Rmnzburg v. H rryes, 408 U. S. G65, 707- 708.
See also, id., at 710 (Po\VJGU, J., concurring).
But we arc here faced with no such constitutional
infirmities in the subpoena to appear before the grand
jury or in the order to make the voice recordings. There
is, as we have said, no valid Fifth Amendment claim.
There was no order to produce private books and papers,
\ and no sweeping subpoena duces tecum. And even if
Branzburg be extended beyond its First Amendment
moorings and tied to a more generalized due process concept, there is still no indication in this case of the kind
of harassment that was of concern there.
The Court of Appeals found critical significance in the
fact that the grancl jury had summoned approximately
20 witnesses to furnish voice exemplars." We think that
fact is basically irreleYant to the constitutional issues
here. The grand jury may have been attempting to
identify a number of voices on the tapes in evidrnce, or
it might have summoned the 20 \Yitnesses in an effort to
identify one voice. But whatever the case, "[a l grand
jury's investigation is not fully carried out until every
available clue has been run clown and all \Yitncsses examined in every proper "·ay to find if a crime has been
committed .... " Un ·ited States v. Stone, 429 F. 2d 138r
140. See also Wood v. Georgia. 370 U. S. 375, 392. As
the Court recalled last Term, "Because its task is to
inquire into the existence of possible criminal conduct
and to return only well-founded indictments, its investigative po,vcrs are necese:arily broad." Rmnzburg v.
'

1

As noted abon•. ante, p. - , there .i~ no ,·;did eompari~on

brt \\'C'f'll the dcntention~ of thr 2+ ~·o11th~ in Da1•is, nnd thr grand
,im~· subporn.1s to t hr willlr~~r·~ here.
\Vhilr I hr clragnrt drtrntion~ b,,. the ]Jolirc did constitute sub~tanti:tl intrusion~ into thC'
Fomth and FourtC'enth Amf'ndmcnt right~ of carh of the ~·ouths
in Davis, no person has a justifiable c~qwctation of imn1unit1· from
a grand jury ~ubpoC'na.

'

~·
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Hayes, 408 U. S., at 688. 12 The grand jury may well
find it desirable to call numerous wituesses in the course
of an investigation. It does not follow that each witness may resist a subpoena on the ground that too many
witnesses have been called. Neither the order to Dionisio
to appear, nor the order to make a voice recording was
rendered unreasonable by the fact that many others
were subjected to the same compulsion.
But the conclusion that Dionisio's compulsory appearance before the grand jury was not an unreasonable
"seizure" is the answer to only the first part of the Fourth
Amendment inquiry here. Dionisio argues that the
grand jury's subsequent directive to make the voice
recording was itself an infringement of his rights
under the Fourth Amendment. We cannot accept that
argument.
In Katz v. United States, supra, we said that the
Fourth Amendment provides no protection for what "a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home
or office .... " 389 U. S. 347, 351. The physical characteristics of a person's voice, its tone and manner, as
opposed to the content of a specific conversation, are
constantly exposed to the public. Like a man's facial
characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly
produced for others to hear. No person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know the sound
of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect
"[The grand .i my] i~ a grand inquest, a body with powers
of investigation and inquisition, the scope of who~e inquiries i~ not
to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecn~ts of
the probable re~:~ult of the inve~tigation, or by doubts whether any
particular individual will be found properly ~ubject to an accusation of crime. A~ has been said before, the identity of the offender,
and the preci:::e nature of the offense, if there be one, normally are
developed at the conclusion of the grand jury'~:~ labor8, not aL the
beginning. Ile11dricks v. United States, 22:3 U.S. 178, 18-±." Blair v.
·c nited States, 250 U.S. 273, 282.
12
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that his face will be a mystery to the world. As the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated:
"Except for the rare recluse who chooses to live his
life in complete solitude, in our daily lives we constantly speak and write, and while the content of
a communication is entitled to Fourth Amendment
protection, . . . the underlying identifying characteristics-the constant factor throughout both public
and private communications-are open for all to
see or hear. There is no basis for constructing a
wall of privacy against the grand jury which does
not exist in casual contacts with strangers. Hence,
no intrusion into an individual's privacy results from
compelled execution of handwriting or voice exemplars; nothing is being exposed to the grand jury
that has not previously been exposed to the public
at large." United States v. Doe (Schwartz), 457
F. 2d 895. 898-899.
The required disclosure of a person's voice is thus
immeasurably further removed from the Fourth Amendment protection than was the intrusion into the body
effected by the blood extraction in Schrnerber. "The
interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth
Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the
mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained."
Schrnerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 769-770. Similarly, a seizure of voice exemplars does not involve the
"severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal
security," effected by the "patdown" in Terry-"surely
. . . an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humilating
experience." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 24-25. Rather,
this is like the fingerprinting in Davis, where, though the
initial dragnet detentions were constitutionally impermissible, we noted that the fingerprinting itself, "involves
none of the probing into an individual's private life and
thoughts that marks an interrogation or search." Davis
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v. Mississippi, 304 U.S. 721, 727; cf. Thom v. Kew York
Stock E:rchange, 306 F. Supp. 1002, 1000.
Since neither the summons to appear before the grand
jury, nor its directive to make a voice recording infringed
upon any interest protected by the Fourth Amendment, there was no justification for requiring the grand
jury to satisfy even the minimal requirement of "reasonableness" imposed by tbC' Court of Appeals.'" Sec
United Slates v. Doe (Schwartz). 457 F. 2d 895, 809-900.
A grand jury has broad invC'stigativc pmvers to determine whether a crimC' has been committed and who has
committed it. The jurors may act on tips, rumors,
evidence offered by the prosecutor. or their own personal
knowledge. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665. 701. No
grand jury witness is "entitled to set limits to the investigation that the grand jury may conduct." Blair v.
United Stales, 250 U. S. 273. 282. And a sufficient basis
for an indictment may only emerge at the end of the
investigation when all the evidence has been received.

"It is impossible to conceive that . . . the
examination of witnesses must be stopped until a
basis is laid by an indictment formally preferred,
"·hen the very object of the examination is to ascertain who shall be indicted." Hale v. Henkel, 201
U. S. 43, 65.
Since Dionisio raised no valid Fourth Amendment
claim. there is no more reason to require a preliminary
showing of reasonableness here than there would be
in the case of any witness "·ho. despite the lack of any
constitutional or statutory privilege, declined to ans",:er
a question or comply with a grand jury request. Neither
the Constitution nor our prior cases justify any such
interference with grand jury proceedings.
' " ln !laic v. Ilrnl.-rl, 201 0. S. 43 , 77, the Court found that such
a ::;tandard had not been met, but a~ noted ahol't', ante, p. - ,
that was a ca~e where the Fourth Amendment lwd been infringed
b~· an overly broad subpoena to produce book:; and paper:;.
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The Ji'ifth Amendment guarantees that no civilian
may be brought to trial for an infamous crime "unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." This
constitutional guarantee presupposes an investigative
body "acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge," Stirone v. United Stales, 361 U. S. 212.
218, whose mission is to clear the innocent, no less than
to bring to trial those who may be guilty.'' Any holding
that would saddle a grand jury with mini-trials and welimmary s wwmgs would assuredly im.pede its investigation and frustrate the public's interest in the
fai;- and expeditious admimstratwn of the criminal laws.
Cf. United States v. Ryan, 4o2 U. S. 530. 532-533;
Costello v. Um'ted Stales, 350 U. S. 359. 363-364; Cobbledick v. United Stateil, 309 U. S. 323. 327-328.'" The
historic conrrpt of the grand jury as a protective bulwark
standing solidly between the ordinary citizrn and an
""IT] he in~titution wn,; :1doptrd in thi" count r~·. and i~ rontinurd
l'rom ron~i(krntion,; ~imilar to tho,;r whirh p:iw to it it~ rhiel' Ya!uc
in Enp:l:11ld, and i" dr,;ip:nr.d as a mran~. not on!~· ol' hrinp:in:.r to trial
prr,;on,; arcu,;rd of public offrrH•rs upon just p:ronncb, bul nl"o a;;
:1 mrans of protecting t hr cit ir.rn aga in~t unfoundrd arcn,;nt ion,
whrt her it eomr:; from gon·rnmrnt. or br prompted b~· p:lrti,;an
pa;;,;ion or prin1tc enmit~· . No person shall hr rr<]nirrd, according to thr fnndamrntal law of thr conntr~·, excrpt in the ra~rs
mrntioncd, to :ln~\1'<'1' for nn~· of thr higher crimrH unle~~ thiH body,
conHi~t ing of not lc~~ than sixt('rn nor .more than twrnty-thrrr good
and llnl"ful mrn. srlcrtcd from thr body of thr diHtrirt, shall clednrr,
upon rarrful delibrration, under the solemnity ol' an oath, thul
thrre is good re:J,on for his arru~nt ion and trial." Ex parte Bain,
121 U. S. 1, 11 ((]uotinp: grand .iur~· charge of .Tm;tire Firld). 8rr
al,;o Wood "· Gcoraia. 370 P. R. :37!), 390.
'" Thr. po~,;ibililie;: for clrla~· enu~NI b~· rrquiring initial :<howings
of '' rra~onnblcnr~~" nrc illustrnt rd b~ · thr Court of APJirnls' ~u b~r
quent dPri~ion in In 1·r. September JlJ/'1 Grand Juru. 45+ F. 2d 5RO,
rr1·'d sub nom, United States v. Jl!a.ra. post. p. - , when• the
C'omt hrld that t hr G01·rrnmrnt wns rrquirrd to Hhow in 1111
ncii 'Pl'~:tr~· hearing thnt it,; rC(]liPHt for exc•mpLtr" was rc·n~on:1blr,
nnd "reasonahlenr~s" included proof thnt the rxrmplan; rould 110t
be obtnined from other sourres.
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overzealous prosecutor may no longer be wholly realistic,
but if the grand jury is even to approach the proper performance of its constitutional mission, it must be free
to pursue its investigations unhindered by external influence or supervision, so long as it does not trench upon
the legitimate rights of any witness called before it.
Since the Court of Appeals found an unreasonable
search and seizure where none existed, and imposed a
preliminary showing of reasonableness where none was
required, its judgment is reversed and this case is remanded to that Court for furth; proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

